Tabnak.ir published a piece last week announcing the creation of a new organization dedicated to the study of the environmental effects of large-scale water diversion from Khuzestan province. Khuzestan is known for is extensive agricultural base (3,300,000 hectares) and is home to Iran’s only navigable river, the Karun, proposed in the late 80’s as a potential source of fresh water exports to the Arab Gulf States. The society’s website, www.waterkhz.ir, is still under construction.
Monthly Archive for February, 2009
The following article was published on 23 February on the Persian and Arabic sections of the Asr-e Iran news analysis website. Attributed to the site’s editor-in-chief, Jafar Mohammadi, it provides a fascinating glimpse into the Iranian perspective on the ongoing diplomatic row with Bahrain. Our translation of selected excerpts is below.
A response to the latest controversy from Arab leaders and their media: Don’t make claims on Iranian land lest you be faced with counter-claims
Asr-e Iran: The latest Arab recriminations against Iran on the Bahrain issue are the principal reason for writing this short essay that was published on both the Persian and Arabic sections of the site.
Three things can be said regarding the small state of Bahrain:
1. Denying history
It is a historical reality that, at one time, the island of Bahrain was a part of Iranian territory, the southernmost part of Iran. This is an issued that history has settled. Yet at the same time, it is possible to feign ignorance and ignore history; one might pretend that Bahrain, over the last 40-50 years, came into existence by rising up from under the sea!
2. Accepting history while rejecting the status quo
In a different view, it is possible to accept historical reality while resisting the current situation, thus saying that it is correct that Bahrain, as an independent nation, is a member of the international community,yet there was once a time when it was part of Iranian territory, and must once again re-join its motherland. It is clear that this viewpoint is not consistent with twenty-first century realism.
3. Accepting history and the status quo
Thus, we acknowledge Bahrain’s Iranian past, yet we now also officially recognize its independence, a position that both conforms to historical reality and takes the current situation into account. Continue reading ‘An Iranian Editor Responds to the Bahrain Tussle’
The Irish prediction market website Intrade aims to harness the power of crowds to foresee future events like election results, economic conditions, the probability of war or Oscar winners. It allows individuals to place bets that a certain event will or won’t happen, and, so the theory goes, the more bets being placed on a certain event, the more accurately that the current price will reflect the probability of that event’s taking place.
Looking at the above screenshot from Intrade’s page on the Iranian elections, we see that the market gives Ahmadinejad betwen a 40-50% chance of being re-elected. But the key thing about this “market” is that volume is extremely low, with only 54 betting incriments being placed on Ahmadinejad, and just 2 on Khatami (which puts him at between 37-66% to win). By contrast, markets covering American politics routinely draw tens of thousands of bets, thus are more accurate. So few bets on the Iranian election explains the wide range given for the two candidates’ chances and also means that these numbers should be taken with a bigger grain of salt than in higher volume markets.
An article appearing in the print edition of Al Hayat Feb. 19th quotes Iranian President Ahmedinejad as warning Obama, in a speech delivered in Yazd, that he must make real changes to American foreign policy or face a fate worse than Bush–and more quickly: “He who follows the policies of the previous President Bush, will meet his fate.” Chief UN Weapons inspector Mohammed El Baradei, speaking at a conference in Paris, interpreted Ahmedinejad’s remarks to indicate Iran’s feeling that it should be recognized as a major regional power, if not the major regional power. Baradei said further that he believed Iran’s main goal on the nuclear front was to be acknowleged as having being a nuclear power (having “breakout capacity”), even if it did not proceed to the next stage, i.e., manufacture of a nuclear weapon.
I couldn’t resist posting this video that I found on Iranian.com. It is footage from 1971 of Mohsen Pezeshkpour, leader of the ultra-nationalist Pan Iranist Party, railing against the Shah’s decision to separate Bahrain from Iran in a deal with the British. The party is now largely defunct, but its expansive Iranian nationalist sentiments live on in the Islamic Republic through words of people like Hossein Shariatmadari of Kayhan and now Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, former Majlis speaker and member of the Expediency Council.
But while these ideas live on in a minority, comparing 1971 with today shows how much the regional power balance has shifted. In the 70s the Shah was riding high on oil wealth and arming himself to the teeth with American weapons. The Shah’s main concern in the Gulf was Saddam Husein, and today’s Bahrain and UAE were political nonentities with no geopolitical heft to speak of. It was not surprising, then, to see the likes of Pezeshkpour allowed to air their extreme views with impunity on the floor of Parliament.
Iran’s furious backpeddling and attempts at damage control after the current incident are a stark reminder of how Gulf Arab states are in a relatively better position economically and politically vis a vis Iran than they were under the Shah. Clearly Iran does not wish to further galvanize the GCC against it and endanger its lucrative gas deal for the sake of a few ill-concieved and unrealistic nationalistic statements. At a time when the Gulf Arab states spare no opportunity to sound the alarm about Iran’s “hegemonic aspirations,” perhaps this is a reminder that their position isn’t quite so precarious after all.
King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia recently announced a fairly extensive liberalizing reform package, including the first appointment of a woman as a deputy minister, the firing of Sheikh Saleh Luhaidan as the head of the country’s courts system, and removing the head of the Wahhabi religious police. Luhaidan ruffled quite a few feathers last year when he said that owners of satellite stations who broadcast “indecent programming” are subject to execution. For a quick roundup of the reforms check out Simon Henderson writing here.
I wanted to highlight a few reactions from around the Gulf. An article in Iran’s main state news agency, IRNA, begins by calling the changes, a “sidelining of opponents of strengthened relations with Israel” and “an effort to strengthened relations with the west and the Zionist regime.” The article continues with a standard analysis of the move as an effort to “reduce internal pressures” and sees the measures as more evidence of competition between the liberalizing Prince Faysal and the Wahhabi establishment. Engaged in a full fledged media war with Saudi Arabia, Iranian state media waste no chance to pick at rifts in the Al Saud, speculate on the health of the king, or otherwise attempt to embarrass.
An opinion piece in yesterday’s National, on the other hand, welcomed the measures and downplayed internal splits:
These days, though, family dynamics are well managed by King Abdullah. There are certainly differences of opinion among the senior princes, which is often the case in the consultative systems of the region, but there is no obvious paralysis in the decision-making process and no flagrant obstruction of the King’s decisions. Rather the gradual opening guided from the King’s diwan is gathering momentum and support, not only among elites but also average citizens….
And the religious establishment is being tamed. The interfaith initiative of King Abdullah is certainly aimed at reassuring the world that Islam and other faiths can coexist peacefully, but it is as much a message to his own people that they have everything to gain from opening up to other cultures…
But my favorite reaction by far comes from a reader claiming to be from Minneapolis, who comments below the National article:
God bless King Abdullah! Beneath his crown lies a very wise and intelligent man. He is a role model the scholars of the Golden Age would celebrate.
So we are left with a familiar pattern where coverage breaks down along lines of friendship (or not) with Saudi Arabia. The main caution I would give is that this type of media coverage is largely driven by the political scene, not the other way around. The Saudi-Qatari rapprochement of the last few years clearly demonstrates how a political mending of fences can quickly put a stop to the type of hostile media coverage seen in Iran’s media. The factionalization of Saudi Arabia’s royal family is not news to anyone who follows these issues, and the Iranian coverage really adds nothing new to our knowledge of the complex and opaque system that governs the kingdom. For a more subtle analysis, I’d point you to Andrew Hammond’s recent article in Arab Media & Society, that tracked the tensions between Abdallah and Luhaidan over media and judicial issues over the past year.
“Manama ceases its discussions on Iranian gas imports, and rejects Tehran’s ‘agression’,” is the headline of today’s print edition of Pan Arab Asharq Al Awsat. Bahrain’s action comes after yet another senior Iranian official allegedly reiterated Iran’s claim to Bahrain as its 14th province. The remarks, attributed elsewhere to Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, a member of Iran’s Expediency Council and former Speaker of Parliament, constitute third time in as many years that an Iranian official has provoked Arab Gulf ire by perpetuating Iran’s long-standing, intermittent claim to ownership of the neighboring island nation. Previous remarks were attributed to the Editor of State-run Kayhan, Hussain Shariatmadari, and Dariush Qanbari, an Iranian member of parliament.
Sheikh Jasim Saidi, a Salafist member of Bahrain’s parliament, called for the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador and a break in formal relations. The National Association for Oil and Gas would look to other neighboring countries, and increased local exploration to fulfil its incrasing natural gas needs,” as Bahrain could “not continue to negotiate with an ‘entity’ that denied its existence. ” The London-based Al Hayat leads with Saudi condemnation of Nateq Nouri’s remarks, which the Kingdom refers to as a “violation of Bahrain’s Arab identity.” Interviewed on Al-Jazeera radio, an unnamed Arab official was quoted as saying the incident was most unproductive, as Iran has much to gain from better relations with its Arab Gulf neighbors.
Iran gas interest seen rekindled by Russia crisis (Forbes)
“Iran’s attraction as an alternative source of gas supply to Europe is slowly gaining momentum following a crisis over Russian gas supplies in January, top industry oil executives said on Wednesday.“
Iran’s inflation falls to 24% low in January (Arabian Business)
“Iran’s annual inflation rate fell more than two percent to 24 percent in January, a newspaper on Saturday quoted the central bank’s governor as saying.”
Iran-Oman Gas deal sealed (Zawya)
“Gas has started flowing from the West Bukha offshore field shared by Oman and Iran, and will be processed in the UAE by the Ras al Khaimah Gas Commission (RAKGAS).”
Economic Imbalance Between GCC and Iran Worrisome (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research)
James Russell sees a Gulf security fallout from economic crisis
Investigations into tanker crash begin (The National)
“…Inflatable booms were placed around the damaged tanker yesterday to prevent spillage of its cargo of 30,000 tonnes of condensed liquid natural gas.
However, the ship’s operator, the Italian firm Martinoli Consulting, said the damaged part of the tanker had been empty at the time of the accident.”
The author of “Ahmadinejad’s Nemesis” (The Gulf, Jan. 10-16) restates what should have been obvious to U.S. policy makers for some time: the longer-term fate of Iran’s leadership and the identity of Ahmedinejad’s successor hinges much on what happens to the Iranian economy.
It has been fashionable of late to claim Iran’s economy is “relatively” unscathed by the global credit crisis, as international sanctions effectively shielded the Iranian economy from easy money and fancy derivatives that have caused so much damage elsewhere. This is only partly true. The fatal blow for the Iranian economy may yet come with the fall in the price of oil, which of course is linked to the state of the global economy.
Ahmedinejad’s popularity in part is based on his ability to divert state funds to Iran’s lower classes. With oil revenues providing 90% of the State budget, the President’s electoral grease is running low. As the above-mentioned article points out, herein lies an opportunity for the US and Western allies to apply more pressure. Should this pressure be applied, and to what ends?
Piecemeal sanctions, in isolation, will not force the Iranian regime to give up the pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities–global economic crisis or no. Weak conciliatory gestures on the part of the US, will also never lead to a positive result. While a “carrot and stick” approach to Iran has a logical ring to it, if one considers what is required by way of cooperation from friends, quasi-allies and worse, it is completely un-workable. Where, then, should we be looking for a solution to the Iran problem? Perhaps our own basic, unadulterated self-interest, for that is likely where Iran’s leadership and its people will look for a solution to their American problem.
A U.S. administration that rushes neither to court or vilify Iran, would almost certainly face a better prospect of ‘movement’ on the relevant issues than the confrontation-baiting Bush, particularly if the Iranian leadership has decided it needs a life preserver. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that the world financial crisis gives everyone a sense of reality, and cooperation happens, if not quickly, then “naturally.”
Yesterday Mohammad Khatami officially declared he would run in the June presidential elections. Thanks to Marc Lynch who flagged an important article from a regular columnist in Asharq al-Awsat, a newspaper that while not official, has ties to the more ‘liberal’ wing of the Al Saud. For a bit more on the newspaper and its track record of supporting the Saudi line, check out Andrew Hammond’s article in Arab Media & Society (shameless plug alert) from fall of 2007. Below is my translation of the article (with a few less important parts omitted):
We don’t want Khatami to win the presidency
by Abd al-Rahman al-RashedThere is a sense of enthusiasm and cautious optimism since former Iranian president Muhammad Khatami announced that he would run in the Iranian presidential elections. For many, Khatami represents a peace-loving moderate Iranian political model following a long series of conflict-seeking leaders. This is correct, yet to stake anything on Khatami is a mistake, not because of the reformist leader himself, but because of the Iranian power structure. Indeed, the system is composed such that it doesn’t permit a popular but politically weak president like Khatami to steer Iranian politics in a way he sees fit. The proof of this is his previous presidency [1997-2005] in which he suffered serious, humiliating setbacks at the hands of extremist elements within the system. This included the closure of newspapers and magazines affiliated with him, barring candidates from this faction from running, and harassment of his staff – to the point where he was marginalized and left the presidency without achieving anything important that he had promised the Iranian people and was elected to do.
As for the current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he truly belongs to the ruling regime; he belongs to the Revolutionary Guard which has become more powerful than at any time in the past, and more involved in domestic and foreign affairs. He is closer to the ruler who wields true power – the supreme leader Sayed Ali Khamenei. It is thus better to keep Ahmadinejad in power than to hope for a president like Khatami….
And while Islamist reformers might still be the preferable choice for winning the election, if they win, this still would not be cause for much celebration because they will be doves without wings. If there is to be a real agreement (or not) it must be with the true holders of power.
