The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-e Eslami) along with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC or Pasdaran) are learning to conduct electronic warfare in real-time, but are carrying it out in a particularly Iranian way.
Much like the police response so far in the streets, they have largely avoided draconian responses to demonstrators. They continue to throttle internet connectivity and conduct spotty blockages of sites, but have not shut down Internet access – even in response to external Denial of Service attacks launched from abroad. They have throttled cell phone networks, but this too has been spotty and rather selective. Reports are circulating that they appear to be trying to round up Twitter account holders, but given the continuous stream of posts by known opposition members, they are either very bad at what they do or are holding back. Or this itself is a rumor, purposefully planted (which, if true, is producing exactly the opposite effect intended).
One reason for the authorities to stifle, bully, and threaten but not completely suppress the protesters is to create opportunities for spoofing accounts on various social media sites like Twitter, claiming to be anti-government protesters and spreading all manner of rumors. In one instance quickly identified as being false, a report of large Army contingent – with tanks, no less – was approaching Tehran.
Another reason for the particular approach relates more directly to the nature and current state of Iranian politics, and the need to create a space for negotiation in the coming weeks. It’s in no group’s interest to simply mass-arrest or kill large numbers of demonstrators. Deploying the Basiji thugs is one thing; sending in the Army and IRGC regulars to clean house is quite another. At the same time, the protests have weakened the current leadership in ways it may not yet fully appreciate, which adds considerable risk and uncertainty to the current situation and whatever backroom dealing ensues. Either way, this past week and the next few weeks ahead could set a very different course for the country.
An OpEd appearing in today’s Arabic-press quotes an anonymous Western diplomat as saying he believes Ahmedinejad won the election by the numbers (”Ahmedinejad’s ‘Success’ Delivers Iran into the hands of the Extreme Right”, Huda Al Husseini, Asharq Al Awsat, 6/18). The interesting thing, according to Al Husseini’s source, is that so many people within Iran believe he did not.
Perhaps the Sepah e Pasdaran were spooked by Mousavi’s expressions of pre-polling confidence, and uncertain of the impact of foreign polling and/or social networking technology, and decided not to take any chances. Hence the odd Ahmedinejad majorities in pro-Mousavi locales, the swiftness of the manual vote counting and the comfortable –but not excessive–margin of victory by Ahmedinejad.
Whatever the case, Al Husseini says, it will be increasingly difficult to convince people either in or out of Iran in light of ongoing violent crackdowns, that the regime has the full confidence of its people–in fact, this behavior may have changed quite a few minds. This further feeds into the deep rooted fear of the current leadership that outside powers might make a try at regime change (fears the Obama administration is wisely not stoking). In the past, this was one of the primary motivations for the Islamic Republic to develop nuclear weapons. That motivation has just got much stronger. Al Husseini points to the next few weeks, and ‘behind the scenes dealmaking’ as critical. No doubt, former President Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, reportedly bent on unseating the Supreme Leader, will play a key role in all of this. If protests subside, and no second or partial polling takes place (unlikely, says another source), look for an ‘extreme right-wing’ government, and a very difficult time ahead.
–EDC
I am translating this article from the website of Third Wave, a pro-Mousavi and Khatami reformist group, on today’s arrest of Mohammadreza Jalaeipour, who is a student at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. -WW
Mohammadreza Jalaeipour, an official and spokesman for the pro- Khatami and Mousavi movement Third Wave, arrested Wednesday morning.
According to Third Wave, Mohammadreza Jalaeipour, a third year doctoral student at Oxford University studying Sociology of Religion, was departing for England with his wife at 1 AM this morning when he was arrested by security forces at the airport and his passport seized. According to Fatimeh Shams, his wife, who is also a member of the central committee for Third Wave, Jalaeipour is among the Iranian intellectual elite who won the first prize in the Konkour (Iranian national college entrance exam) in the year 1380 (2001-2). He is also winner of the gold medal in the national round of the Literary Olympics. He is currently a student at Oxford University.
His wife, Fatimeh Shams, said she was particularly worried by the way the arrest took place, “After about 5-10 minutes of waiting, an agent wearing civilian clothes took my husband with him without presenting any official order, and giving him only a few seconds to speak with me.”
She added: “My husband had come to carry out some research related to his doctoral thesis and had reserved a return ticket to England two months ago to return to Oxford at the end of the term to present his results. However he was prevented from travelling by this unknown accusation.”
Mohammadreza Jalaeipour has been a part of the Third Wave civil-legal campaign since last summer. During this time, he has been bound to all legal and administrative principles of this socio-political campaign.
Any further information on this situation will be immediately released.
UPDATE: There are reports on 14 Sept, 2009 that Jalaeipour has been released from Evin prison after 88 days.
My eyes are getting tired from staring at this news for too long but wanted to post one more. There is quite an interesting debate going on about the nature of the Mousvi movement and the base of support for the current protests in Iran. Rob at Arabic Media Shack sums up a debate between Juan Cole on the “elections clearly rigged” side and Andrew Exum, among others on the “Western media are elitist and underestimate Iranians’ true arch-conservatism” side. Rob came down on the Exum side, asking if we were wildly misreading Iran through the lens of Western journalists. For me, watching the videos of the Mousavi protests that came out today left little doubt that there is a fairly broad based mass movement on the Mousavi side, not just some pajama wearing twitter jockeys (spoken with love from someone who has been glued to the twits all day and not left the house). So what’s going on and how do we know these are significant? A few points:
- Khamenei has already backed down and assented to an investigation into vote rigging. This is the day after he declared Ahmadinejad’s a “divine victory.” A huge climb down any way you look at it.
- The government all day on state media had been announcing that the protests were not legal or had been cancelled. The protests ended up being enormous, to the point where the government resorted to gunfire to break them up. (Last I heard they were decamping to a Tajrish protest led by Karroubi)
- The shots fired and casualties mean that there will be memorial services in 40 days for those killed tonight, thus lowering the chances that this will go away quietly
- Coverage is bad outside Tehran, but I am seeing some Twitter reports of violent protests in other cities. This is a place where projects like Swift and Meedan have a lot of potential – filtering out the “reTweets” and organizing the information in a more usable way
- We need to see how this plays out, but there is a major component of intra-elite competition and rivalry going on within the government. This is not just a mass movement of disaffected youth, but one that is tearing the Islamic Republic’s leaders apart. Witness the statements by Rafsanjani before the vote and after, the protests of several clerics, and also voting objections raised by former Revolutionary Guard commander and candidate Rezai — not exactly a narrow sliver of Iran’s political spectrum. The best roundup of these angles is in the Jim Muir’s snap analysis here. I agree with him and ISN’s Kamal Nazer Yasin that all eyes will now be on Qom for more clergy to announce where they stand.
This is a developing and explosive situation, and there is no telling how it will end up. At very least, it will mean a severe reshuffling of who the major Tehran power players are. I think, however, it goes far beyond the smaller bouts of unrest we have seen in the last ten years. The Obama Administration is doing well to express concern, but avoid getting to far into the fray.
Signing off for tonight but keep up to date with Cole, NIAC, CUMINet, Meedan, Sullivan, Uskowi, Ulrich.
-WW
According to a report on the reformist “Third Wave” website, At 1600 Tehran time (about 10 minutes from now) Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and former President Muhammed Khatami will participate in a rally in central Tehran. The route is planned from Englelab Square to the Azadi Monument (see route marked in above photo courtesy of Google Earth). The site reports that the has not been given national or city-level permission, but that Mousavi will attend “out of respect for his supporters, encourage calm and to speak with them.” The report also notes that Zahra Rahmavard, Mousavi’s wife will also attend.
Given reports that Mousavi is either under “house arrest” or under surveillance at his home it will be a critical test for the regime whether he is permitted to travel to the site or not. The presence of Khatami is also very significant since he has been keeping a very low profile for the last few days. See below (also courtesy of Google Earth) two zoomed in pictures of the start and end points.
UPDATE: Follow the Iran election Twitter feed on the right sidebar.
Englelab (Revolution) Square
Azadi (Freedom) Monument
Here’s a screen cap from the front page of today’s Etemad-e Melli, the mouthpiece of Mehdi Karroubi’s party of the same name. It reads “Interior Ministry announces Karroubi comes in fifth.” But wait, there were only four candidates running? According to the ministry 1.04% of ballots were declared invalid, which bested Karroubi’s reported .85%.
Meanwhile. over Nader Uskowi is citing “reliable source at Iran’s Ministry of Interior” who said that the real totals were as follows:
Mousavi: 19,075,623 = 52%
Ahmadinejad: 13,387,104 = 37%
-WW
In an interview with Asharq AlAwsat Sunday, June 7, Mehdi Karroubi, head of the Etemad-e-Melli party and a Reformist candidate for President, described current relations between Iran and the GCC, Egypt and Yemen as ‘tense’. Karroubi, a.k.a. the “Reform Sheikh”, attributed this to mis-understandings between each side regarding the ultimate goals and political ambitions of the other. He said further that the Gulf region must be a place of lasting peace, free of “constant sectarian recriminations. ” With respect to Yemen, Karroubi said he felt that much of the tension in relations sprang from current problems within Yemen.
In an interview with the same publication the following day, and presumably partly in response to Karroubi’s statements, Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi said Yemen was in favor of better relations with Iran, based on “non-intervention in domestic affairs.” He added that he did not believe that Iran was backing Zaidi (Shiite) Houthi Rebels in Northern Saada provice—at least not as a matter of policy. –EDC
Iran’s 10th Presidential Election on June 12, 2009 has created a rush of adrenaline throughout cities, towns, and villages all across the country. Streets are painted with political fervor, excitement, and beyond all hope. As Election Day draws closer Iran’s political climate is getting more charged, with presumptions of behind-the-scenes rigging.
According to Aftab News, on Thursday June 11, 2009 at 11 PM–only 9 hours before the start of polling–, Ahmadinejad’s government commanded the banning of SMS messages. It is believed that these measures were taken to restrain and limit the digital space for the supporters of the leading reformist candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi. In response to this ban Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, the head of the Committee for the Protection of Votes has submitted a complaint to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology demanding an immediate resolution to the instability in the country’s wireless phone systems. Mohtashamipour argues that such conditions prohibit communication amongst the representatives monitoring the fairness of elections at different polling stations. These events occur in the backdrop of a heated presidential race that can serve as a tipping point for the future of Iran and its 66 million citizens.
–Negar Mortazavi
The usual suspects, Juan Cole, Gary Sick, Laura Rozen, and Rasmus Christian Elling are all over tomorrow’s Iranian elections. The main storyline these days is the huge groundswell of support that seems to be welling up for the reformist Mir-Hosein Mousavi (betting on Intrade has him up by a minimum of four points), and the accompanying backlash from conservative elements. But I’m worried by this news in my inbox this morning:
“The presence of supporters of Mirhossein Mousavi on the streets are part of the velvet revolution,” said Yadollah Javani, head of the Guards’ political office, using a term used to describe the 1989 non-violent revolution in Czechoslovakia.
“Any kind of velvet revolution will not be successful in Iran,” he said in comments published on the Guards’ website.
The “enghelab-e makhmali” or “velvet revolution” charge is political dynamite in Iran — calculated to tweak that hyperactive bit of Ali Khamenei’s brain stem that guards at all costs against being thrown from power by a peaceful protest movement (for more on this check Karim Sadjadpour’s brilliant report on Khamenei from a while back). It was these charges that hardline elements cited to justify holding Haleh Esfandiari, cracking down on student protesters, rights activists, etc. Casting the Islamic Republic’s constitutionally mandated elections process as a counter-revolutionary coup takes this thinking to a whole new level. Via Gary Sick, here’s a video of Mousavi supporters taken from a few days ago when they formed a human chain on Tehran’s longest thoroughfare Vali Asr – pretty scary stuff:
[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PP-iji4VTQQ&feature=player_embedded]
Faced with the prospect of vicious infighting following a Mousavi win (see also Rafsanjani’s recent appeals to Khamenei against Ahmadinejad) , the depressing question for the U.S. is if it would have been better to negotiate with a conservative united rather than fractious Iranian government. I think Trita Parsi (as usual) gets it right in this piece by Rozen:
But such internal fissures could paralyze a political system that needs a certain level of consensus to function, according to Parsi. ‘[The Iranian leadership] may simply be too divided and involved in trying to heal rifts to be able to deal with the United States,’ he said.
I for one am still not convinced that Mousavi will win. During the Iranian elections cycles you tend to get a North Tehran effect where media coverage centers on the more liberal, reform-minded segments of the population and doesn’t venture out to the provinces where Ahmadinejad’s base lives.
But whatever happens, the main legacy of this election will be the sheer volume of awesome campaign theme songs it has produced. I for one will be rocking out to this Mousavi track at the gym later today:
Mousavi Song (MP3)
-WW
