Monthly Archive for July, 2009

NYUAD: Success in Numbers

Published on July 30, 2009 in Education, Politics and Trade. 0 Comments

In a little more than a year, a large pair of scissors will come across a large red ribbon and thus mark the inauguration of nothing short of the world’s biggest experiment in higher education. NYU Abu Dhabi will welcome its first students. As detailed in a recent two-part report by John Gravois in The National (Part I, Part II), NYU administrators have aggressively sought to preempt many of the challenges plaguing other Western degree programs in the Gulf, namely low student enrollment and an inability to recruit and then retain faculty.

NYUAD’s team on the ground has been given a sizable time window (at least in relative terms) through which to problem solve. The ambitious project was first announced in October 2007. By way of contrast, Michigan State University was asked to set up shop in neighboring Dubai inside of a year. Despite offering coursework with obvious links to the local economy (including degree programs in Business Administration and Construction Project Management), MSU-Dubai has experienced early troubles with enrollment, attracting just 40 students in 2008-2009.

For the fall of 2010 NYUAD will take in no more than 100 students but then projects to grow– and grow quickly– to 2,000 undergraduates and 800 graduates. To arrive at these numbers NYUAD is employing a strategy that is surprising as it represents a marked break from regional precedent.

The case of Qatar Foundation and its Academic Bridge Program serve as perhaps the most prominent divergence. Qatar Foundation sets enrollment targets for Qatari nationals and each of the six American universities located in Doha’s Education City. Even as the targets are non-binding, the Bridge Program gives an additional year to two years of preparatory schooling for Qataris transitioning to university. In so doing, the available pool of qualified local students is increased and low numbers across the Education City campuses are given a boost.

NYUAD has taken an entirely separate approach. The enrollment of a desired number of Emiratis is neither explicit nor implicit. University President John Sexton believes that UAE nationals are likely to be only a tiny percentage of the student population and he is unabashed in saying so. There is no preparatory, foundation year program. Instead, Sexton and NYUAD have ramped up admissions requirements and dubbed the Abu Dhabi venture NYU’s “honors college.” The “global education” offered at NYUAD will attractively combine with unparalleled financial aid packages– international students who would otherwise attend the Ivies (or else NYU’s Washington Square campus) will opt for freshman orientation Gulf-style. An estimated 40 to 50% of the student body will be made up of Americans.

By all accounts, NYUAD will open its doors with an impressive faculty. Whether the university can reach a total of 2,800 enrolled students, however, remains to be seen. Some observations about their efforts to date:

1) There will assuredly be dynamic tension between the appeal of an exciting, newly-established institution– indeed, perhaps the beginnings of the future of higher education itself– and a half-formed university experience. With less than 100 first-year students, the extracurricular opportunities on offer are sure to be limited. Abu Dhabi is likely to be a jarring introduction to the American freshman who traditionally stays in-country for his or her undergraduate experience (and all the more so given the UAE’s average highs of 102 degrees Fahrenheit in September). Whether NYUAD will be able to retain students from one year to the next is a question that needs considering.

2) There will assuredly be tension, no less dynamic, inspired by the availability of world-class education– expensively funded by the Emirate– and its inaccessibility to the local population. Relative to Dubai, Abu Dhabi has long-demonstrated a consistent uneasiness with the course and speed of societal change, the size and composition of its expatriate population and the loss of local heritage and culture. The issue of NYUAD’s labor policy has already cropped up and could become particularly thorny. In the absence of a large Emirati student contingent, NYUAD’s ability to meaningfully link up with the community and its existing universities becomes all the more vital.

3) Lastly, NYU is wisely utilizing the Institute of International Education toward identifying potential applicants. The IIE (the American non-profit responsible for administering the Fulbright) does not have a relationship with neighboring Iran. Before its Revolution, Iran had the single highest population of international students in American universities. NYUAD’s success in enrolling even a handful of students from Iran would do more than add to student numbers. It would also bolster Sexton’s case for the emergence of the Global Network University and its potential implications for the 21st century.

-SW

Arvand Free Zone: Pass Through for Pistachio Kings?

Published on July 19, 2009 in Politics and Ports. 0 Comments

Tabnak.ir this week carried a piece alleging abuses of power and position within Iran’s Arvand Free Zone (AFZ), under the heading, “Free Zone is a Pass-through for Regime Favorites.” Located along the Iran-Iraq border in Khuzestan, AFZ is one of Iran’s most ambitious free zone/special economic zone projects, and site of Khorramshahr port.

The story alleges that one connected individual got his job as Director of AFZ Flight Operations based on ‘exaggerated reports’ of his work experience, limited to “purchasing buses and setting up coolers.” Further, the brother in law of one of President Ahmediejad’s ‘best buddies’ was allegedly promoted to the post of the Director of Free Zone Investments immediately after Ahmedinejad was confirmed in his second term. In a third case, a scandal following the appointment of a son of the Chief of Staff of defeated Presidential candidate Mir Hussain Musavi to another high FZ appointment caused the relevant department the Free Zone to be quietly ‘neutralised.’ President Ahmedinejad, asked on a recent tour of the area where the Zone’s revenues were coming from, allegedly replied “I’ll look into it.”

The piece ends by questioning whether one of Iran’s high profile free zones have become simply a pass through for temporary directors, friends of those in high places and those looking for experience in the “Pistachio” business (a clear reference to the basis for former President Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s vast wealth). Arvand Free Zone was the subject of some controversy in 2005, after the British Ahwazi Friendship Society published documents it alleges shows the Iranian regime’s plan to relocate thousands if not hundreds of thousands of ethnic Arab Ahwazis from Arvand to make room for a 5000 sq km demilitarized zone, which it additionally alleged would facilitate Iran’s ‘de facto’ annexation of Basra–which its report notes is ‘literally a stone’s throw’ from the Zone in places (23 Teer 1388).

–EDC

The Wiles of Qeshm

Published on July 13, 2009 in Uncategorized. 0 Comments

In an article posted in Farsi to the Qeshm Free Zone Authority (QFZA) website, a senior official at QFZA says he is seeing a spike in the number of Dubai-based investors expressing interest in Qeshm Free Zone: “With the growing crisis in the countries of Persian Gulf, and due to a collection of economic problems in Dubai, many investors are leaving the region and coming to QFZ, offering as it does ample land, various financial inducements, and favorable conditions for industrial investment. ” Not content to fire a shot across the bow of mammoth facilities to the South, the QFZA official also took the opportunity to remind his government that Qeshm industry is in need of active protection and support of the state, if it is to make the most of its largely virtual amenities. All of which concludes with my favorite quote of the week: “I expect that with growth, industry on Qeshm island will see future expansion in its heavy and light industrial projects.” As for Dubai, one expects all’s not yet lost.

-EDC

G8->Iran->Oman->Syria

Published on July 12, 2009 in Uncategorized. 0 Comments

Asharq Al Awsat, in its July 12 print edition, quotes Iranian officials as saying they are preparing a ‘new package’ of positions on international security, politics and international relations. This reformulation, apparently, is to serve as the basis for ‘renewed discussions’ with the West, and follows warnings from the G8 Summit that Iran has “until September to engage in negotiations over its nuclear program or face even more painful sanctions.” At roughly the same time, Iranian foreign minister Manuchehr Mottaki announced the Islamic Republic is on the verge of signing a security pact with the Sultanate of Oman, an agreement Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin Aloui said would lead to a “new stage in the bilateral relationship…and a firm basis for growing cooperation with Iran.” [Interestingly, a picture above the story shows bin Aloui and Iranian President Ahmedinejad under a large map, on which is prominently written "Persian Gulf"]

Thickening the diplomatic stew, the Syrian government paper “Tishreen” reported today that Syrian president Bashar Assad received a letter from Sultan Qaboos urging Syria to take advantage of ‘positive Arab environment’ to help find a common solution to security issues facing the Arab states.

Clearly, Oman continues its traditional role of “balancer” within the GCC and Arab world in general, hoping to keep all sides in the game, and talking. These are not new moves, for during the last two years Oman has been increasingly public in its high-level engagement with Iran on commercial matters–particularly during the last months of the Bush administration, when US-Iran tensions hit their last trough. Oman, which has strong historical/commercial/security ties with Iran, clearly feels it is in the position to say what many other States in the Gulf will not, or cannot: i.e., a hot conflict between the West and/or “centrist”, Sunni Arab states and Iran over nuclear issue has the potential to set the region–Iran included–back a good many years.

-EDC

Does a Disordered Iran Risk Pushing Damascus toward Riyadh?

Published on July 10, 2009 in Politics and Security. 0 Comments

In the latest issue of In the latest issue of The Atlantic, staff writer Jeffrey Goldberg asks his readers to imagine the possibility of a Jewish-Sunni alliance. At a moment in history when both Israel and the Middle East’s predominantly Sunni states are ostensibly threatened by Iran, Goldberg posits that such a configuration would effectively challenge Tehran’s rise. It would be “grand, if necessarily implicit” alliance.

Goldberg is correct in that Iran’s ambitions, when coupled with the instability and fallout of its elections, are already forcing a recalibration of interests among regional policymakers. We may yet see surprises. We will not, however, see a Jewish-Sunni alliance. If we were to draw on the lessons of 1991– when American policymakers scrambled to stop Israel from entering, and possibly fracturing, the Gulf War coalition– a military alliance with Israel would, at this time, be hard-pressed to move from the realm of the implicit to the practical. In the practical, a Jewish/Sunni fighting force would surely threaten the internal stability of the participating Sunni regime. And if an alliance is not practical, then what good is it?

Instead forging an alliance with Syria is worth much more. The struggle for Syria is alive and well, it is only the players that have changed. Iraq is no longer vying with an ascendant Egypt for control of Damascus. Instead Cairo and Baghdad have been eclipsed and then enveloped, if only imperfectly, into the larger Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Syria is Iran’s most important and longstanding regional alliance– one forged and maintained more out of pragmatism than shared ideology. And as such it may now be appropriate to ask if Tehran has overstretched, if the alliance doesn’t project to be far more trouble than it’s worth, and if Damascus is nearing the borders of the Riyadh camp.

For now Asad is safely perched on the fence. Ahmadinejad visited Damascus as recently as May but Riyadh has also made significant overtures. In March Asad met alone with Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah ahead of the Doha Summit and reports suggest that the Saudi King offered Damascus aid that would offset that already being given by Tehran, an estimated $1 billion (Qatar’s investment of $4 billion might also be jeopardized by a shift). A further promise of mobilized Arab backing in the peace process was extended. And for as much as the Iranian-Syrian relationship has given Damascus vital strategic depth in the Levant, if past is precedent, then even a temporary détente with Riyadh could act to improve the Syrian position in Lebanon. Of course, a full break– a grand shift– would mean abandoning Damascus’ Lebanese and Palestinian proxies, an unlikely outcome unless accompanied by tangible American and Israeli assurances. The significance of even a partial break in the Syrian-Iranian alliance should therefore not be underestimated.

Yet a grand shift in Syrian strategy becomes conceivable when considered against the backdrop of economic crisis and a long-stalled local economy. Tens of thousands of Syrians working in the Gulf have lost their jobs this year and will have to return home. Syrian expatriates remitted an estimated $850 million in 2008. Syria could reasonably calculate that a move away from Iran would relieve anxieties among Gulf policymakers and perhaps convince Washington to lift its policy of economic sanctions. The June visit of Mid East envoy George Mitchell, and the announcement of the return of an American ambassador to Damascus may suggest that the Obama administration is willing to chart a new path with Syria and bring actual pressure to bear on Israel over the Golan.

There is little to suggest that Syria could survive a face-to-face confrontation with Israel and as Israel becomes more bellicose toward Iran, Damascus may be looking for a way out of its alliance. But such a grand shift in strategy is almost always precipitated by an economic crisis. When Egypt left the Arab Camp it was facing the failure of socialist economic policies at home. When Syria last faced a grave economic test with the fall of the Soviet Union, it willingly committed 19,000 of its troops to fight another Arab state and, in so doing, win back financial support from the Gulf as well as improved relations with the West.

With a politically unstable and diplomatically overstretched Iran offering little to boost a floundering Syrian economy, Damascus could increasingly look to Riyadh and Washington. It would have to be convinced, however, that the Obama administration, unlike the Bush administration, operates independently of the wishes of Tel Aviv. Goldberg’s Jewish-Sunni alliance is fanciful. But a Washington-backed Damascus-Riyadh-Cairo axis– as briefly existed just after the first Gulf War– could be the unexpected outcome of disorder in Iran and the new struggle for Syria. -SW

Report: US/Iraq Release 5 Iranian Diplomats

Published on July 9, 2009 in Politics. 0 Comments

Very significant news out of Iraq today that the five Iranians arrested by U.S. forces in 2007 in the Kurdish capital of Erbil have been released. My first instinct is to read this as a major goodwill gesture from the Obama Administration to Iran; a way to indicate continued commitment to engagement in the wake of the election protests. These five have been the most publicized Iranian detainees in Iraq, but there are dozens more who remain in US-Iraqi custody, to repeated Iranian protest. BBC report follows. -WW

Five Iranian officials held by the US military in Iraq since January 2007 have been freed, according to Iranian state media.

Tehran’s ambassador to Baghdad was quoted as saying US forces had handed the five, whom he said were diplomats, to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki.

Hassan Kazemi-Qomi said they would soon be taken to the Iranian embassy.

US forces seized the five in the Kurdish city of Irbil on suspicion of arming and funding Shia militias.

There was no immediate comment from the US embassy on Thursday about the reported releases.

The Fars news agency quoted Mr Kazemi-Qomi as saying the five “kidnapped by American occupying forces have been handed over to Iraq’s prime minister.

“They will soon be handed over to Iran’s embassy in Iraq,” he said.

After the arrests, Washington said the five Iranians had no diplomatic status, but Tehran accused the US of breaching international diplomatic regulations.

The Iraqi authorities said at the time the five Iranians had been in Irbil with official approval, but that their office had not yet been granted full consulate status.

US authorities had said the five included a senior member of Iran’s Quds Force, an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards.

Washington has accused the force of helping arm and train some Iraqi militants, a claim Tehran denies.

The former US military commander in Iraq, Gen David Petraeus, once accused Mr Kazemi-Qomi of belonging to the Quds Force.

Khiaban 8: "What do the People Want?"

Published on July 6, 2009 in Politics. 0 Comments

Nat Troy sends along this translation from Issue 8 of Khiaban. Thanks Nat!

“What do the people want?”

The coup d’état government did not expect the people to stand against it with such courage and solidarity and has lost its focus. The government continues to fight and try to stand on its feet again. But every action it takes backfires. During a revolution a regime digs itself deeper with every action it takes to preserve itself.

The government closes existing semi-independent media sources; freedom of the press becomes a demand of the people. The government tortures detainees; outlawing torture becomes a demand of the people. The government tramples on the people’s vote and defends its right of rule by the few over society; rule by the people becomes a demand of the people. The government sends the guards and the basij to kill and crush the people; the dissolution of these institutions of repression becomes a demand of the people. The government throws political opponents in prison; the release of all prisoners becomes a demand of the people. The government represses young people and women; the young people and women turnout on the square for their freedom. The government denies people the right to determine their own fate based on religion; the separation of church and state becomes a demand of the people. The government uses existing laws to repress the people; a change in laws becomes a demand of the people. The government uses economic pressure to stop strikes; a society free from economic pressure on living standards becomes a demand of the people. The government prevents freedom of worship; freedom of worship becomes a demand of the people. The government declares a ban on public gatherings; a system that officially recognizes freedom of assembly and protest becomes a demand of the people. The government fires a bullet into the throat of a young women; the voice of young women becomes louder and more enveloping. The government is imprisoning writers; freedom of the pen is becoming more universal. The government is cutting off communications among the people; free and easily accessible communication networks are becoming a more universal demand. Owners of factories and manufacturing centers are fighting demands for strikes; labor control over industrial and manufacturing centers is becoming a demand of workers. The government is jailing people accused of belonging to political parties and organizations; freedom of political party and organization activities is becoming a more widespread demand. The government becomes more barbaric; a noble life is becoming more important.

A transformation is beginning. At the same time, pressure is building. New dreams are taking shape in the consciousness of society. Dreaming of all that seemed impossible has become universal with everyday of struggle. You see the spark in people’s eyes. You see the revolution.