Monthly Archive for August, 2009

(Dr?) Kamran Daneshjo

Published on August 31, 2009 in Education and Politics. 0 Comments

Full Name: Prof. Daneshjo, KamranPosition: Professor

Phone: 98-21-77240540-50 Ex:2906

Fax: 98-21-77240488

Email: kdaneshjo@iust.ac.ir
Address: Iran University of Science & Technology, Tehran, IRAN

University Degrees

PHD, Manchester Imperial Institute of Science and Technology, U.K.
MSC, Manchester Imperial Institute of Science and Technology, U.K.
BSC, Queen Mary, U.K.

As Iran’s 290 member parliament continues three days of debate over the composition of the Ahmadinejad cabinet, objections to the president’s picks, mostly on grounds of inexperience, are many. As a measure of lost legitimacy, Ahmadinejad is reportedly facing unprecedented pushback from leading figures of the 220-member conservative bloc. Eleven of his 21 nominations represent new faces and 16 are being questioned.

Ahmadinejad may have to weather a new and particularly embarrassing storm over his nominee to head Iran’s higher education system. The L.A. Times blog has picked up on reports by the reformist website Mowjcamp.com suggesting the credentials of Kamran Daneshjo (alternately spelled Daneshjoo)– currently a professor of mechanical engineering at the Iran University of Science Technology– are dubious. In his official biography, Daneshjo holds a doctorate in aerospace engineering from a “College of London,” with apparently no further explanation needed. His website-listed resume, however, sites a MSc and Ph.D. from “Manchester Imperial Institute of Science and Technology.” There is no way to verify if Daneshjo did, in fact, attend Manchester Imperial because Manchester Imperial does not exist.

A BSc from “Queen Mary” could also use some clarification. It’s possible, perhaps even likely, that this refers to Queen Mary , University of London. There is also a Queen Mary’s College but it’s a preparatory academy, with most of its students between the ages of 16 and 19. QMC is located more than an hour outside of London and it certainly does not award doctorate degrees in aerospace engineering.

The LA Times incorrectly repeats a claim made by Mowjcamp.com– that Daneshjo’s inventory of academic publications cannot be found online, implying that its entirety is potentially bogus. Daneshjo is indeed a published academic. But for the prospective head of Iran’s nearly 3 million university students, such basic biographical misrepresentation could mean another political hurdle for Ahmadinejad. The case might become an unwelcome replay of the Oxford degree fabrication that forced Ali Kordan, the Minister of Interior, from power last year.

Yet perhaps there is a simple justification for all of this. When the majlis votes on individual nominees this Wednesday, we’ll surely know more. For now the inconsistencies in Daneshjo’s record are enough to raise some eyebrows and prompt some questions. After all, engineers tend to appreciate accuracy. And it’s not unfair to expect the author of “Classical coupled thermo elasticity in laminated composite plates based on third-order shear deformation theory,” to correctly recall the name of his own alma mater. -SW

Luft on Iran’s Gas Industry

Published on August 25, 2009 in Energy, Natural Gas and Politics. 0 Comments

Building on our recent discussion of the Iran gasoline sanctions debate, I wanted to flag two recent pieces by Gal Luft of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. The first is from Foreign Affairs earlier in the month in which Luft makes two arguments:

Sanctions on Iranian gasoline imports will not hit hard because the country has taken steps to beef up refinery capacity and is reducing its gasoline consumption by encouraging substitute fuels. Luft cites a 25% reliance on imported gas, in contrast to the 40% figure that is regularly cited in the press.
The better way to hurt Iran would be to thwart its plans to export gas to Pakistan (then possibly on to India) and Turkmenistan (and then possibly on to Europe).

This article parallels a longer piece Luft published in the Journal of Energy Security in June, in which he fleshes out the potential implications of Iran developing its gas markets to the east. Luft asserts that Russia is keen to get Iran’s gas exports focused eastward so it can continue to dominate Europe’s energy scene, and warns that Iranian gas pipelines to Pakistan could give Tehran energy leverage over the subcontinent similar to that which Russia exercises over Europe.

While Luft’s contrary view on Iran’s gasoline import dependence is interesting and the second piece does a good job of gaming-out geopolitical possibilities of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (read it all here), my concern is about the underlying sanctions logic:

Across both articles, Luft implies that thwarting Iran’s Pakistan pipeline scheme will force Tehran to rethink its nuclear ambitions. Yet Iran is hardly out of options when it comes to using its gas: It could re-inject gas into its aging oilfields to boost production, explore export options to Europe, make a dash for LNG technology, or continue to orient towards domestic use. So rather than capitulate on the nuclear program — a key security and energy priority (not to mention point of national pride) — Iran is likely to pursue its gas plan B ( and C, D, and E) first.

-WW

On the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act

Published on August 21, 2009 in Natural Gas, Politics and Trade. 0 Comments

I have a piece in this week’s Review section of The National arguing against the Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009 that we’ve been discussing on this blog quite a bit lately. The first few paragraphs are below, but click through to The National for the full article. -WW

Built to Spill

Americans like to think of sanctions as a targeted measure, but restricting Iran’s oil imports would distort trade in the whole region, argues Will Ward.

Iran’s Achilles heel, goes the mantra of many Washington hawks, is its dependence on imported petrol – the result of underinvestment in its energy industry during three decades of sanctions. While the country is a net oil exporter, Iran’s domestic refining capacity lags, forcing the Islamic Republic to import roughly a third of its daily petrol needs from abroad and ration consumer fuel purchases.

The US Congress is currently considering a bill, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would exploit this weakness by penalising companies and individuals that import petrol into Iran or invest in its domestic oil and gas infrastructure. The rosy logic behind the sanctions bill, which currently enjoys majority support in both houses of Congress, is not new: the hope is that ordinary Iranians, squeezed at the petrol pump, will pressure their recalcitrant leaders to halt uranium enrichment, embrace Israel and stop their unpalatable activities in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. That, or Tehran will lash out frantically in response, which will lead to an international consensus for even tougher sanctions – or worse.

Opponents of the bill have already pointed out many of its flaws: for starters, Iran could seek investments from Russia and China to build new refineries. Beyond that logistical loophole, it is also the case that Iranians generally support the country’s nuclear programme – and even if they didn’t, forcing Iran’s increasingly authoritarian government to reverse course would require months, if not years, of struggle and bloodshed. Sanctions against oil-producing nations often starve business and civil society, while the continuing flow of oil profits to the state leaves the targeted regimes more, rather than less, powerful – Saddam Hussein’s reign in Iraq being the best example.

But even this litany of concerns about the efficacy of sanctions leaves aside a critical issue: the potentially disruptive consequences for the wider region. America, the world’s most prolific user of economic sanctions, conceives of them as narrowly directed measures against the target state – the impact on neighbouring states rarely registers in Washington. But sanctions, particularly on consumer products with mass demand like petrol, tend to produce distortions in regional trade dynamics that can have political repercussions. Powerful incentives are generated to meet demand for the sanctioned products, inside and outside of the targeted state, creating economic imbalances in the region and political tensions with the state that has imposed the sanctions. And in the case of petrol sanctions on Iran these consequences are likely to be acute, given the long and storied history of trade relations across the Gulf.

Click here to continue reading

Qatar Resumes Ferry Service to Iran, Citing Economic Ties

Published on August 12, 2009 in Ports, Shipping and Uncategorized. 1 Comment

According to a recent piece in the UAE’s The National, Qatar has allowed an Iranian shipping oufit, Valfajre8 to resume service from Doha to ports in Iran, after a hiatus. Sources cited refer to Qatar’s desire to improve economic ties and facilitate exchange with Iran. According to websites belonging to other Iran-owned ferry companies, service between Gulf Arab ports and Iran (Kish and Bandar Abbas, for example) has been suspended indefinitely. In the wake of the presidential elections in Iran, Kuwait-based Al Jazeera airlines summarily suspended service on a busy Mashad-Bahrain route. –EDC

Will Europe be Buying Gas from Tehran in 2020?

Published on August 11, 2009 in Energy and Natural Gas. 0 Comments

Planned Nabucco Route (Wikipedia)

Yesterday’s Iran Economist featured an interview with Seyyed Reza Kasaizadeh, director of the National Iranian Gas Export Company, discussing Iran’s desire to export natural gas to Europe, both through the planned “Persian Pipe” project and to supply feedstock to the Nabucco Pipeline. A few translated excerpts:

Compared with other gas export projects, Iran prefers to deliver its gas to the Greek, then European markets once the “Persian Pipe” project is completed.

Iran’s position in international affairs is sacrosanct because the planned route of the Nabucco Pipeline requires Iranian participation. Iran will not lose its international position because it is one of the most important gas suppliers and has the second largest gas reserves in the region.

Plans for the Nabucco pipeline and other similar projects will not be executed without Iranian participation….If European countries want to pipe Asian gas to Europe, they will need to include Iran in their plans because the countries party to pipeline agreements like Nabucco do not have the necessary feedstock to fill the pipelines.

The parties to the Nabucco pipeline have only reached an agreement over the path of the pipe, not the volume of gas to fill it. The question is whether or not countries can ensure the necessary gas for their pipeline – this question will decide if the project is economically viable or not, and this is where talks with Iran become necessary.

Iran, as holder of the world’s second largest gas reserves, must organize its future projects such that it raises its share of world gas exports from one to sixteen percent

In the near term, it is unlikely that Iranian gas will be included in Nabucco due to the harsh and potentially tightening sanctions environment. Yet Iran has been aggressively trying to expand its gas export business, beginning exports to Armenia in May, and recently announcing a deal to build an export pipeline to Pakistan. It has also explored deals with UAE’s Dana Gas, although negotiations are currently deadlocked over price. The planned Persian Pipeline will use Turkey and Arab countries as intermediaries in the hopes of allaying sanctions risk to European energy companies of doing business with Iran directly.q

Looking at the 10 year and beyond horizon, it becomes harder to see how the sanctions regime against Iran can withstand the tide of growing energy demand and rising oil prices, which make gas comparatively more attractive. Kasaizadeh has a point about Iran’s huge (and easily produced) gas reserves. In the absence of a US-Iran deal, a point is coming where the profits to be made from Iranian gas transport will exceed the costs of American sanctions. How soon depends on your outlook for world growth and energy prices.

-WW

The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act: Prudence or Prelude?

Published on August 9, 2009 in Natural Gas, Politics and Trade. 0 Comments

“He’s the elected leader.” Those were the words of White House Spokesperson Robert Gibbs (later retracted) one day ahead of Ahmadinejad’s inauguration in Tehran this past Wednesday. Concurrently, American media circles reawakened to the unlikelihood of Iran meeting the Obama-imposed September deadline. What should be done when, months after a fraudulent election and weeks after struggling to put together a cabinet, a disordered Iran fails to respond to American diplomatic overtures?

For many, two words suffice: tougher sanctions, shorthand for the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act. Consider recent comments made by R. Nicholas Burns, former Undersecretary of State and leader of Bush’s Iran strategy, “Draconian sanctions did not make sense in 2005 and 2006 but given the new weakness and vulnerability of the Ahmadinejad government, much tougher sanctions make sense now.” The assertion that regime instability somehow additionally opens Iran to the intended consequences of sanctions is problematic enough. But Burns further advocates that Obama be given complete autonomy when threatening, imposing or waiving the economic penalties and it is this condition that reveals much about its policy prospects.

Firstly, the condition is there to attract multilateral participation– if the US succeeds in winning allies for the imposition of a gas embargo, Obama’s promise of flexibility is meant to keep the coalition together. Continued loopholes are implicit and economic interests in diverse, participating countries are less threatened than might first meet the eye. Between February 1999 and June 2006, an estimated $80 billion + worth of foreign investment went into Iran’s energy sector despite the existence of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA, originally ILSA), passed into law in 1996.

A quandry: For sanctions to stand a chance at being effective the targeted country must perceive that the costs of defiance are greater than the costs of compliance. Without the participation of China, Russia, Germany, the UAE et al. this calculation is unlikely (and even more so because Iran’s hardliners can be expected to use foreign pressure toward consolidating power). Yet gathering an effective coalition will require flexibility– if not in letter then in lax enforcement. So in both instances the sanctions stand to be neutralized.

More ominously, studies on sanctions (check out the Peterson Institute website if you haven’t already) demonstrate that their efficacy toward authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes is lost unless backed by a willingness to progress toward the military option. Far from a prudent substitute for the rush to war, sanctions can become a prelude– in this case we may be seeing a slow but sadly predictable march. -SW

A Shadow Big Enough to Hide… A Sultanate

Published on August 6, 2009 in Uncategorized. 0 Comments

A spokesman for Sultan Qaboos intimated last month, perhaps inadvertently, that the Sultan might be a bit edgy about making his first state visit to Iran since the Revolution around now—But the Sultan did come, just in time for Ahmediejad’s swearing in, and with all of his energy, trade, gas and economy ministers in tow. Was the idea that the shadow of that event was so big that it could hide the Sultanate? Hard to believe, but maybe it was. Noone outside the two parties seem to want to touch this with a ten foot pole.

Over the last three days, the two countries signed agreements and MOUs related to “mutual security, and the fight against smuggling and crime, including the exchange of related information”, “environmental, technical and professional cooperation”, and “cultural exchange”. The list goes on. Apparently Muscat will even open a Farsi language institute shortly. Particularly notable are agreements governing the long-discussed joint development of Hengam gas field and setup of a joint 500 MW power station within Qeshm Free Zone (see recent posts for more on QFZ).

All of this is page 4 news in the Saudi-financed Asharq Al Awsat (the visit itself sort of made the firont page yesterday), and doesn’t seem to have hit the US papers but minimally. Of course, the Omanis need much of what Iran can offer in terms of assistance, and the Iranians need the diplomatic boost, but does this seem like the actions of a Gulf State itching for nuclear power and/or a nuclear shield to protect itself from its evil neighbor to the north? In fact this is the long-awaited denouement of an escalating series of very senior and mainly commercial exchanges dating back more than 2 years. –EDC

How Do You Say "Awkward" in Farsi?

Published on August 4, 2009 in Politics. 0 Comments

Here’s a video from Ahmadinejad’s election certification ceremony on Monday. Much was made about Ahmadinejad kissing Khamenei’s hand at his 2005 inaguration, so it seems significant that this year yielded an awkward rebuff when Ahmadinejad went in this year. The moment is getting quite a ton of play in Arab media. I got an urgent text message alert yesterday on my phone from the Egyptian-run Middle East News Agency, and below is a series of frames that Asharq al-Awsat splashed on today’s front page. A CBS news video flagged by Juan Cole cited this as evidence of “cracks in the leadership.” But given the events of the last two months, I’d say this is more nick in the varnish than crumbling foundation. -WW

Rezaee: Economic Federation Better Than Stagnation

Published on August 3, 2009 in Education, Free Trade Zones and Politics. 0 Comments

In a pre-election debate, Ahmedinejad paid challenger Mohsen Rezaee (An arch conservative and former head of the Revolutionary Guards, who also holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Tehran University) ta’arof as one of the few candidates with ‘new ideas’. He then mocked Rezaee’s proposal to divide Iran into nine economic regions or ‘focal points’ as wholly unworkable: “How can one have economic federalism without political and administrative components? “, he asked.

Rezaee replied that he actually did mean economic federalism, not full federalism, and that matters of international policy, defense, etc. remain with the center. Rezaee explained that while there might be 40-45 provinces or more, each with their own devolved political and security functions, economic blocs would be much larger: “There might be nine economic administrators with full visibility on the activities of their respective regions. These would be responsible for their regional economic blocs and (report to) the president.” Ahmedinejad responded by saying that that dividing the country into nine administrative units was in fact not a new concept, as it had been proposed at one time by the Sepah (Revolutionary Guards). Furthermore, Ahmediejad told Rezai, “economic administration without political or social direction is without meaning.”

The federal question has been one that has plagued Iran for centuries, with decentralisation (or, more precisely, lack of central control) being both a cause of Iran’s economic stagnation, as well as the hallmark of some of the more productive periods in Iran’s past. As Springborg and Clement put it, Iran’s modern dysfunction has been a failure to globalize. Rezaee’s conception of economic federalism relates somewhat to the policies of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose attempts at privatisation and export-promotion through China-esque Free- and Special Economic Zones have met with limited success. While these ideas are only sketches of plans thus far, they do constitute thought, in contrast to Ahmedinejad’s vigorous defense of the status quo.

–EDC

The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning for Rafsanjani?

Published on August 2, 2009 in Politics. 0 Comments

Some call him the kingmaker, for his deep influence over the Iranian political process. No surprise, then, that in the wake of the disputed elections, the recently publicly pro-Reformist Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani would become the object of a very personal counter attack from the usulgaran, or ‘extreme conservatives’.

As a number of prominent reformists go on trial accused of fomenting election disturbances a host of hardliners have come looking for blood, and it’s Rafsanjani’s. Ayatollah Jennati during last week’s Friday prayer, alleged that Rafsanjani, Khatami and Mousavi had conspired together to disrupt the elections for at least three years [Jennati lost to Rafsanjani in 2007 elections for Chairman of the Council of Experts, which 'elects' the Supreme Leader]. Shariatmadari, editor of regime mouthpiece Kayhan, today announced that Rafsanjani was guilty of treason.

The Iranian newspaper Fars reports that six well-known reformists on trial in Tehran, have “confessed” that the elections were completely clean, and that Rafsanjani has been driven since his 2005 Presidential election loss to Ahmedinejad to put a limit to the power of Ayatollah Khamenei (and the concept of Vilayat-e Faqih, or rule of the Jurist) and to exact personal revenge.

While Rafsanjani took a big hit in recent years with pervasive charges of corruption and influence-dealing, he seems to have reclaimed some of his popularity, particularly in comparison to Mousavi, whose Reformist credentials are truly ersatz. Many clearly feel his almost “Republican” approach to international trade and politics offers the most promising path to a steady opening with the West. The battle between Rafsanjani and the Supreme leader for the Supreme Leader’s absolute influence will do much to decide the character of Iran’s inevitable transformation.