According to an Op Ed in Friday’s Pan Arab Al-Hayat (”Gulf Doubts Continue on Iran Intentions, Request Participation in Dialogue”, 18 Dec.), GCC members last week called for the West (5+1 countries) to actively include the body in its decision-making on Iran.
According to statements issued during the event, the GCC as an organization has no interest in negotiating with Iran on nuclear issues directly (most of the GCC states have acknowledged Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy), but called on the West to incorporate Gulf Arab views, and on Iran to respect international laws and obligations. Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs was quoted at another event on the opening day of the Summit as saying “strengthening sanctions on Iran was ‘not a fair measure’”, given the dialogue itself had been severely handicapped by the lack of active participation by the Arab Gulf States. Even as Congress voted to implement penalties on foreign companies found to be selling Iran refined fuel, many in the US Administration are thought to be looking for a way to back down on implementing immediate sanctions, for fear that this will further harden Tehran’s already highly defensive position, and accelerate enrichment. U.S. Asst. Secretary for NEA, Jeffrey Feltman, responding to the GCC statements said from the region (paraphrased) that the US recognises there are some differences in views with respect to Iran policy, and that he would make sure the message was heard in Washington.
All of this underscores the continued chaos and cross-currents that characterize the international response to Iran’s nuclear activities, whether within the US government, the West, or locally. One might be tempted to give the GCC somewhat more credit as a policy organ if summit proceedings hadn’t been taken up with certain member states’ mutual recriminations, and failed attempts to decide the venue of the next summit. –EDC
Signals from the Gulf states about their imposing Iranian neighbor understandably often seem carefully balanced, so the sort of information in this post is very useful. In the context of Erdogan’s effort to fill the empty regional moderate position as leader of an international effort to drag Washington and Tehran toward a compromise, what evidence do you see of Turkish-GCC coordination?