… to Iran in the Gulf! As our name implies, we plan to keep track of developments in the region and use this site as a sounding board for ideas that will develop into more formal writing on Iran’s relationship with its neighbors across the Gulf.
I want to begin with a Bloomberg article from today about the UAE’s civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the US. It’s not particularly groundbreaking, but touches on many of the issues that we will be covering here. The article is brimming with quotes from US politicians and nonproliferation types praising the deal, by which the UAE forswears domestic enrichment in exchange for America’s blessing and technical support. The obvious message to Iran being that playing by the nuclear rules pays off. Amid the sea of praise comes a voice who nonetheless raises a proliferation concern:
Joseph Cirincione, president of the San Francisco-based Ploughshares Fund, a nonproliferation foundation, says he worries that power plants can be ‘the starter kits for nuclear weapons,’ and that some nations may have ulterior motives in seeking nuclear energy.
‘Iran’s rivals cannot afford to let it gain the military, political and diplomatic leverage conveyed by nuclear weapons,’ he says. ‘What’s to stop them once they’ve built the reactors from adding on a fuel-making facility?’
The concern that nuclear infrastructure — no matter how well safeguarded — poses a significant proliferation risk looks much less relevant in the wake of the Bush years, which saw nuclear cooperation expand with US allies like India who for decades have been developing nuclear infrastructure — including weapons — outside the NPT. Under Bush, nuclear policy was sharply politicized; friendly countries got technology and a blind eye towards past excesses while enemies like Iran and Syria got sanctioned or bombed.
Gulf countries — Iran included — have four main reasons to develop nuclear technologies: prestige/nationalism, weapons potential (not necessarily immediate), to free up more hydrocarbons for export, and to diversify energy sources thus improving energy security. The key difference is that Iran seeks to enrich its own uranium while the UAE has committed to obtaining its nuclear fuel from outside sources, and, of course, that Iran is not friendly with the United States and its allies.
Where does this leave us? A few thoughts:
1. I would argue that Iran’s hostility to the U.S. and Israel, and general regional tensions have much more to do with causing the “Iran nuclear crisis” than the nitty gritty of how many centrifuges are spinning, etc. Solve the regional strategic problem by creating an Iranian-American-Israeli modus vivendi , and you have solved 95% of the Iranian nuclear problem.
2. It is getting harder and harder to control the flow of nuclear material and know-how. This is partially the result of the Bush administration’s politicization of nuclear deals, but mostly, it has to do with the inability of governments to control the spread of knowledge and technology, and their unwillingness or inability to sanction allies who proliferate.
3. At least in the short term, the global financial crisis looks set to be the proliferation hawk’s best friend. Nuclear plants cost $ 2-3 billion a pop, most of which must be spent in foreign exchange. And you can’t exactly abandon one in the airport parking lot and skip town if you miss a few payments.
