Archive for the 'Politics' Category

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(Dr?) Kamran Daneshjo

Published on August 31, 2009 in Education and Politics. 0 Comments
AWT IMAGE Full Name: Prof. Daneshjo, KamranPosition: Professor

Phone: 98-21-77240540-50 Ex:2906

Fax: 98-21-77240488

Email: kdaneshjo@iust.ac.ir
Address: Iran University of Science & Technology, Tehran, IRAN

University Degrees

  • PHD, Manchester Imperial Institute of Science and Technology, U.K.
  • MSC, Manchester Imperial Institute of Science and Technology, U.K.
  • BSC, Queen Mary, U.K.

As Iran’s 290 member parliament continues three days of debate over the composition of the Ahmadinejad cabinet, objections to the president’s picks, mostly on grounds of inexperience, are many. As a measure of lost legitimacy, Ahmadinejad is reportedly facing unprecedented pushback from leading figures of the 220-member conservative bloc. Eleven of his 21 nominations represent new faces and 16 are being questioned.

Ahmadinejad may have to weather a new and particularly embarrassing storm over his nominee to head Iran’s higher education system. The L.A. Times blog has picked up on reports by the reformist website Mowjcamp.com suggesting the credentials of Kamran Daneshjo (alternately spelled Daneshjoo)– currently a professor of mechanical engineering at the Iran University of Science Technology– are dubious. In his official biography, Daneshjo holds a doctorate in aerospace engineering from a “College of London,” with apparently no further explanation needed. His website-listed resume, however, sites a MSc and Ph.D. from “Manchester Imperial Institute of Science and Technology.” There is no way to verify if Daneshjo did, in fact, attend Manchester Imperial because Manchester Imperial does not exist.

A BSc from “Queen Mary” could also use some clarification. It’s possible, perhaps even likely, that this refers to Queen Mary , University of London. There is also a Queen Mary’s College but it’s a preparatory academy, with most of its students between the ages of 16 and 19. QMC is located more than an hour outside of London and it certainly does not award doctorate degrees in aerospace engineering.

The LA Times incorrectly repeats a claim made by Mowjcamp.com– that Daneshjo’s inventory of academic publications cannot be found online, implying that its entirety is potentially bogus. Daneshjo is indeed a published academic. But for the prospective head of Iran’s nearly 3 million university students, such basic biographical misrepresentation could mean another political hurdle for Ahmadinejad. The case might become an unwelcome replay of the Oxford degree fabrication that forced Ali Kordan, the Minister of Interior, from power last year.

Yet perhaps there is a simple justification for all of this. When the majlis votes on individual nominees this Wednesday, we’ll surely know more. For now the inconsistencies in Daneshjo’s record are enough to raise some eyebrows and prompt some questions. After all, engineers tend to appreciate accuracy. And it’s not unfair to expect the author of “Classical coupled thermo elasticity in laminated composite plates based on third-order shear deformation theory,” to correctly recall the name of his own alma mater. -SW

Luft on Iran’s Gas Industry

Published on August 25, 2009 in Energy, Natural Gas and Politics. 0 Comments

Building on our recent discussion of the Iran gasoline sanctions debate, I wanted to flag two recent pieces by Gal Luft of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. The first is from Foreign Affairs earlier in the month in which Luft makes two arguments:

  1. Sanctions on Iranian gasoline imports will not hit hard because the country has taken steps to beef up refinery capacity and is reducing its gasoline consumption by encouraging substitute fuels. Luft cites a 25% reliance on imported gas, in contrast to the 40% figure that is regularly cited in the press.
  2. The better way to hurt Iran would be to thwart its plans to export gas to Pakistan (then possibly on to India) and Turkmenistan (and then possibly on to Europe).

This article parallels a longer piece Luft published in the Journal of Energy Security in June, in which he fleshes out the potential implications of Iran developing its gas markets to the east. Luft asserts that Russia is keen to get Iran’s gas exports focused eastward so it can continue to dominate Europe’s energy scene, and warns that Iranian gas pipelines to Pakistan could give Tehran energy leverage over the subcontinent similar to that which Russia exercises over Europe.

While Luft’s contrary view on Iran’s gasoline import dependence is interesting and the second piece does a good job of gaming-out geopolitical possibilities of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (read it all here), my concern is about the underlying sanctions logic:

Across both articles, Luft implies that thwarting Iran’s Pakistan pipeline scheme will force Tehran to rethink its nuclear ambitions. Yet Iran is hardly out of options when it comes to using its gas: It could re-inject gas into its aging oilfields to boost production, explore export options to Europe, make a dash for LNG technology, or continue to orient towards domestic use. So rather than capitulate on the nuclear program — a key security and energy priority (not to mention point of national pride) — Iran is likely to pursue its gas plan B ( and C, D, and E) first.

-WW

On the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act

Published on August 21, 2009 in Natural Gas, Politics and Trade. 0 Comments

I have a piece in this week’s Review section of The National arguing against the Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009 that we’ve been discussing on this blog quite a bit lately. The first few paragraphs are below, but click through to The National for the full article. -WW

Built to Spill

Americans like to think of sanctions as a targeted measure, but restricting Iran’s oil imports would distort trade in the whole region, argues Will Ward.

Iran’s Achilles heel, goes the mantra of many Washington hawks, is its dependence on imported petrol – the result of underinvestment in its energy industry during three decades of sanctions. While the country is a net oil exporter, Iran’s domestic refining capacity lags, forcing the Islamic Republic to import roughly a third of its daily petrol needs from abroad and ration consumer fuel purchases.

The US Congress is currently considering a bill, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would exploit this weakness by penalising companies and individuals that import petrol into Iran or invest in its domestic oil and gas infrastructure. The rosy logic behind the sanctions bill, which currently enjoys majority support in both houses of Congress, is not new: the hope is that ordinary Iranians, squeezed at the petrol pump, will pressure their recalcitrant leaders to halt uranium enrichment, embrace Israel and stop their unpalatable activities in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. That, or Tehran will lash out frantically in response, which will lead to an international consensus for even tougher sanctions – or worse.

Opponents of the bill have already pointed out many of its flaws: for starters, Iran could seek investments from Russia and China to build new refineries. Beyond that logistical loophole, it is also the case that Iranians generally support the country’s nuclear programme – and even if they didn’t, forcing Iran’s increasingly authoritarian government to reverse course would require months, if not years, of struggle and bloodshed. Sanctions against oil-producing nations often starve business and civil society, while the continuing flow of oil profits to the state leaves the targeted regimes more, rather than less, powerful – Saddam Hussein’s reign in Iraq being the best example.

But even this litany of concerns about the efficacy of sanctions leaves aside a critical issue: the potentially disruptive consequences for the wider region. America, the world’s most prolific user of economic sanctions, conceives of them as narrowly directed measures against the target state – the impact on neighbouring states rarely registers in Washington. But sanctions, particularly on consumer products with mass demand like petrol, tend to produce distortions in regional trade dynamics that can have political repercussions. Powerful incentives are generated to meet demand for the sanctioned products, inside and outside of the targeted state, creating economic imbalances in the region and political tensions with the state that has imposed the sanctions. And in the case of petrol sanctions on Iran these consequences are likely to be acute, given the long and storied history of trade relations across the Gulf.

Click here to continue reading

The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act: Prudence or Prelude?

Published on August 9, 2009 in Natural Gas, Politics and Trade. 0 Comments

“He’s the elected leader.” Those were the words of White House Spokesperson Robert Gibbs (later retracted) one day ahead of Ahmadinejad’s inauguration in Tehran this past Wednesday. Concurrently, American media circles reawakened to the unlikelihood of Iran meeting the Obama-imposed September deadline. What should be done when, months after a fraudulent election and weeks after struggling to put together a cabinet, a disordered Iran fails to respond to American diplomatic overtures?

For many, two words suffice: tougher sanctions, shorthand for the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act. Consider recent comments made by R. Nicholas Burns, former Undersecretary of State and leader of Bush’s Iran strategy, “Draconian sanctions did not make sense in 2005 and 2006 but given the new weakness and vulnerability of the Ahmadinejad government, much tougher sanctions make sense now.” The assertion that regime instability somehow additionally opens Iran to the intended consequences of sanctions is problematic enough. But Burns further advocates that Obama be given complete autonomy when threatening, imposing or waiving the economic penalties and it is this condition that reveals much about its policy prospects.

Firstly, the condition is there to attract multilateral participation– if the US succeeds in winning allies for the imposition of a gas embargo, Obama’s promise of flexibility is meant to keep the coalition together. Continued loopholes are implicit and economic interests in diverse, participating countries are less threatened than might first meet the eye. Between February 1999 and June 2006, an estimated $80 billion + worth of foreign investment went into Iran’s energy sector despite the existence of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA, originally ILSA), passed into law in 1996.

A quandry: For sanctions to stand a chance at being effective the targeted country must perceive that the costs of defiance are greater than the costs of compliance. Without the participation of China, Russia, Germany, the UAE et al. this calculation is unlikely (and even more so because Iran’s hardliners can be expected to use foreign pressure toward consolidating power). Yet gathering an effective coalition will require flexibility– if not in letter then in lax enforcement. So in both instances the sanctions stand to be neutralized.

More ominously, studies on sanctions (check out the Peterson Institute website if you haven’t already) demonstrate that their efficacy toward authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes is lost unless backed by a willingness to progress toward the military option. Far from a prudent substitute for the rush to war, sanctions can become a prelude– in this case we may be seeing a slow but sadly predictable march. -SW

How Do You Say "Awkward" in Farsi?

Published on August 4, 2009 in Politics. 0 Comments

Here’s a video from Ahmadinejad’s election certification ceremony on Monday. Much was made about Ahmadinejad kissing Khamenei’s hand at his 2005 inaguration, so it seems significant that this year yielded an awkward rebuff when Ahmadinejad went in this year. The moment is getting quite a ton of play in Arab media. I got an urgent text message alert yesterday on my phone from the Egyptian-run Middle East News Agency, and below is a series of frames that Asharq al-Awsat splashed on today’s front page. A CBS news video flagged by Juan Cole cited this as evidence of “cracks in the leadership.” But given the events of the last two months, I’d say this is more nick in the varnish than crumbling foundation. -WW

nokiss

Rezaee: Economic Federation Better Than Stagnation

Published on August 3, 2009 in Education, Free Trade Zones and Politics. 0 Comments

In a pre-election debate, Ahmedinejad paid challenger Mohsen Rezaee (An arch conservative and former head of the Revolutionary Guards, who also holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Tehran University) ta’arof as one of the few candidates with ‘new ideas’. He then mocked Rezaee’s proposal to divide Iran into nine economic regions or ‘focal points’ as wholly unworkable: “How can one have economic federalism without political and administrative components? “, he asked.

Rezaee replied that he actually did mean economic federalism, not full federalism, and that matters of international policy, defense, etc. remain with the center. Rezaee explained that while there might be 40-45 provinces or more, each with their own devolved political and security functions, economic blocs would be much larger: “There might be nine economic administrators with full visibility on the activities of their respective regions. These would be responsible for their regional economic blocs and (report to) the president.” Ahmedinejad responded by saying that that dividing the country into nine administrative units was in fact not a new concept, as it had been proposed at one time by the Sepah (Revolutionary Guards). Furthermore, Ahmediejad told Rezai, “economic administration without political or social direction is without meaning.”

The federal question has been one that has plagued Iran for centuries, with decentralisation (or, more precisely, lack of central control) being both a cause of Iran’s economic stagnation, as well as the hallmark of some of the more productive periods in Iran’s past. As Springborg and Clement put it, Iran’s modern dysfunction has been a failure to globalize. Rezaee’s conception of economic federalism relates somewhat to the policies of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose attempts at privatisation and export-promotion through China-esque Free- and Special Economic Zones have met with limited success. While these ideas are only sketches of plans thus far, they do constitute thought, in contrast to Ahmedinejad’s vigorous defense of the status quo.

–EDC

The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning for Rafsanjani?

Published on August 2, 2009 in Politics. 0 Comments

Some call him the kingmaker, for his deep influence over the Iranian political process. No surprise, then, that in the wake of the disputed elections, the recently publicly pro-Reformist Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani would become the object of a very personal counter attack from the usulgaran, or ‘extreme conservatives’.

As a number of prominent reformists go on trial accused of fomenting election disturbances a host of hardliners have come looking for blood, and it’s Rafsanjani’s. Ayatollah Jennati during last week’s Friday prayer, alleged that Rafsanjani, Khatami and Mousavi had conspired together to disrupt the elections for at least three years [Jennati lost to Rafsanjani in 2007 elections for Chairman of the Council of Experts, which 'elects' the Supreme Leader]. Shariatmadari, editor of regime mouthpiece Kayhan, today announced that Rafsanjani was guilty of treason.

The Iranian newspaper Fars reports that six well-known reformists on trial in Tehran, have “confessed” that the elections were completely clean, and that Rafsanjani has been driven since his 2005 Presidential election loss to Ahmedinejad to put a limit to the power of Ayatollah Khamenei (and the concept of Vilayat-e Faqih, or rule of the Jurist) and to exact personal revenge.

While Rafsanjani took a big hit in recent years with pervasive charges of corruption and influence-dealing, he seems to have reclaimed some of his popularity, particularly in comparison to Mousavi, whose Reformist credentials are truly ersatz. Many clearly feel his almost “Republican” approach to international trade and politics offers the most promising path to a steady opening with the West. The battle between Rafsanjani and the Supreme leader for the Supreme Leader’s absolute influence will do much to decide the character of Iran’s inevitable transformation.

–EDC

NYUAD: Success in Numbers

Published on July 30, 2009 in Education, Politics and Trade. 0 Comments

In a little more than a year, a large pair of scissors will come across a large red ribbon and thus mark the inauguration of nothing short of the world’s biggest experiment in higher education. NYU Abu Dhabi will welcome its first students. As detailed in a recent two-part report by John Gravois in The National (Part I, Part II), NYU administrators have aggressively sought to preempt many of the challenges plaguing other Western degree programs in the Gulf, namely low student enrollment and an inability to recruit and then retain faculty.

NYUAD’s team on the ground has been given a sizable time window (at least in relative terms) through which to problem solve. The ambitious project was first announced in October 2007. By way of contrast, Michigan State University was asked to set up shop in neighboring Dubai inside of a year. Despite offering coursework with obvious links to the local economy (including degree programs in Business Administration and Construction Project Management), MSU-Dubai has experienced early troubles with enrollment, attracting just 40 students in 2008-2009.

For the fall of 2010 NYUAD will take in no more than 100 students but then projects to grow– and grow quickly– to 2,000 undergraduates and 800 graduates. To arrive at these numbers NYUAD is employing a strategy that is surprising as it represents a marked break from regional precedent.

The case of Qatar Foundation and its Academic Bridge Program serve as perhaps the most prominent divergence. Qatar Foundation sets enrollment targets for Qatari nationals and each of the six American universities located in Doha’s Education City. Even as the targets are non-binding, the Bridge Program gives an additional year to two years of preparatory schooling for Qataris transitioning to university. In so doing, the available pool of qualified local students is increased and low numbers across the Education City campuses are given a boost.

NYUAD has taken an entirely separate approach. The enrollment of a desired number of Emiratis is neither explicit nor implicit. University President John Sexton believes that UAE nationals are likely to be only a tiny percentage of the student population and he is unabashed in saying so. There is no preparatory, foundation year program. Instead, Sexton and NYUAD have ramped up admissions requirements and dubbed the Abu Dhabi venture NYU’s “honors college.” The “global education” offered at NYUAD will attractively combine with unparalleled financial aid packages– international students who would otherwise attend the Ivies (or else NYU’s Washington Square campus) will opt for freshman orientation Gulf-style. An estimated 40 to 50% of the student body will be made up of Americans.

By all accounts, NYUAD will open its doors with an impressive faculty. Whether the university can reach a total of 2,800 enrolled students, however, remains to be seen. Some observations about their efforts to date:

1) There will assuredly be dynamic tension between the appeal of an exciting, newly-established institution– indeed, perhaps the beginnings of the future of higher education itself– and a half-formed university experience. With less than 100 first-year students, the extracurricular opportunities on offer are sure to be limited. Abu Dhabi is likely to be a jarring introduction to the American freshman who traditionally stays in-country for his or her undergraduate experience (and all the more so given the UAE’s average highs of 102 degrees Fahrenheit in September). Whether NYUAD will be able to retain students from one year to the next is a question that needs considering.

2) There will assuredly be tension, no less dynamic, inspired by the availability of world-class education– expensively funded by the Emirate– and its inaccessibility to the local population. Relative to Dubai, Abu Dhabi has long-demonstrated a consistent uneasiness with the course and speed of societal change, the size and composition of its expatriate population and the loss of local heritage and culture. The issue of NYUAD’s labor policy has already cropped up and could become particularly thorny. In the absence of a large Emirati student contingent, NYUAD’s ability to meaningfully link up with the community and its existing universities becomes all the more vital.

3) Lastly, NYU is wisely utilizing the Institute of International Education toward identifying potential applicants. The IIE (the American non-profit responsible for administering the Fulbright) does not have a relationship with neighboring Iran. Before its Revolution, Iran had the single highest population of international students in American universities. NYUAD’s success in enrolling even a handful of students from Iran would do more than add to student numbers. It would also bolster Sexton’s case for the emergence of the Global Network University and its potential implications for the 21st century.

-SW

Arvand Free Zone: Pass Through for Pistachio Kings?

Published on July 19, 2009 in Politics and Ports. 0 Comments

Tabnak.ir this week carried a piece alleging abuses of power and position within Iran’s Arvand Free Zone (AFZ), under the heading, “Free Zone is a Pass-through for Regime Favorites.” Located along the Iran-Iraq border in Khuzestan, AFZ is one of Iran’s most ambitious free zone/special economic zone projects, and site of Khorramshahr port.

The story alleges that one connected individual got his job as Director of AFZ Flight Operations based on ‘exaggerated reports’ of his work experience, limited to “purchasing buses and setting up coolers.” Further, the brother in law of one of President Ahmediejad’s ‘best buddies’ was allegedly promoted to the post of the Director of Free Zone Investments immediately after Ahmedinejad was confirmed in his second term. In a third case, a scandal following the appointment of a son of the Chief of Staff of defeated Presidential candidate Mir Hussain Musavi to another high FZ appointment caused the relevant department the Free Zone to be quietly ‘neutralised.’ President Ahmedinejad, asked on a recent tour of the area where the Zone’s revenues were coming from, allegedly replied “I’ll look into it.”

The piece ends by questioning whether one of Iran’s high profile free zones have become simply a pass through for temporary directors, friends of those in high places and those looking for experience in the “Pistachio” business (a clear reference to the basis for former President Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s vast wealth). Arvand Free Zone was the subject of some controversy in 2005, after the British Ahwazi Friendship Society published documents it alleges shows the Iranian regime’s plan to relocate thousands if not hundreds of thousands of ethnic Arab Ahwazis from Arvand to make room for a 5000 sq km demilitarized zone, which it additionally alleged would facilitate Iran’s ‘de facto’ annexation of Basra–which its report notes is ‘literally a stone’s throw’ from the Zone in places (23 Teer 1388).

–EDC

Does a Disordered Iran Risk Pushing Damascus toward Riyadh?

Published on July 10, 2009 in Politics and Security. 0 Comments

In the latest issue of In the latest issue of The Atlantic, staff writer Jeffrey Goldberg asks his readers to imagine the possibility of a Jewish-Sunni alliance. At a moment in history when both Israel and the Middle East’s predominantly Sunni states are ostensibly threatened by Iran, Goldberg posits that such a configuration would effectively challenge Tehran’s rise. It would be “grand, if necessarily implicit” alliance.

Goldberg is correct in that Iran’s ambitions, when coupled with the instability and fallout of its elections, are already forcing a recalibration of interests among regional policymakers. We may yet see surprises. We will not, however, see a Jewish-Sunni alliance. If we were to draw on the lessons of 1991– when American policymakers scrambled to stop Israel from entering, and possibly fracturing, the Gulf War coalition– a military alliance with Israel would, at this time, be hard-pressed to move from the realm of the implicit to the practical. In the practical, a Jewish/Sunni fighting force would surely threaten the internal stability of the participating Sunni regime. And if an alliance is not practical, then what good is it?

Instead forging an alliance with Syria is worth much more. The struggle for Syria is alive and well, it is only the players that have changed. Iraq is no longer vying with an ascendant Egypt for control of Damascus. Instead Cairo and Baghdad have been eclipsed and then enveloped, if only imperfectly, into the larger Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Syria is Iran’s most important and longstanding regional alliance– one forged and maintained more out of pragmatism than shared ideology. And as such it may now be appropriate to ask if Tehran has overstretched, if the alliance doesn’t project to be far more trouble than it’s worth, and if Damascus is nearing the borders of the Riyadh camp.

For now Asad is safely perched on the fence. Ahmadinejad visited Damascus as recently as May but Riyadh has also made significant overtures. In March Asad met alone with Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah ahead of the Doha Summit and reports suggest that the Saudi King offered Damascus aid that would offset that already being given by Tehran, an estimated $1 billion (Qatar’s investment of $4 billion might also be jeopardized by a shift). A further promise of mobilized Arab backing in the peace process was extended. And for as much as the Iranian-Syrian relationship has given Damascus vital strategic depth in the Levant, if past is precedent, then even a temporary détente with Riyadh could act to improve the Syrian position in Lebanon. Of course, a full break– a grand shift– would mean abandoning Damascus’ Lebanese and Palestinian proxies, an unlikely outcome unless accompanied by tangible American and Israeli assurances. The significance of even a partial break in the Syrian-Iranian alliance should therefore not be underestimated.

Yet a grand shift in Syrian strategy becomes conceivable when considered against the backdrop of economic crisis and a long-stalled local economy. Tens of thousands of Syrians working in the Gulf have lost their jobs this year and will have to return home. Syrian expatriates remitted an estimated $850 million in 2008. Syria could reasonably calculate that a move away from Iran would relieve anxieties among Gulf policymakers and perhaps convince Washington to lift its policy of economic sanctions. The June visit of Mid East envoy George Mitchell, and the announcement of the return of an American ambassador to Damascus may suggest that the Obama administration is willing to chart a new path with Syria and bring actual pressure to bear on Israel over the Golan.

There is little to suggest that Syria could survive a face-to-face confrontation with Israel and as Israel becomes more bellicose toward Iran, Damascus may be looking for a way out of its alliance. But such a grand shift in strategy is almost always precipitated by an economic crisis. When Egypt left the Arab Camp it was facing the failure of socialist economic policies at home. When Syria last faced a grave economic test with the fall of the Soviet Union, it willingly committed 19,000 of its troops to fight another Arab state and, in so doing, win back financial support from the Gulf as well as improved relations with the West.

With a politically unstable and diplomatically overstretched Iran offering little to boost a floundering Syrian economy, Damascus could increasingly look to Riyadh and Washington. It would have to be convinced, however, that the Obama administration, unlike the Bush administration, operates independently of the wishes of Tel Aviv. Goldberg’s Jewish-Sunni alliance is fanciful. But a Washington-backed Damascus-Riyadh-Cairo axis– as briefly existed just after the first Gulf War– could be the unexpected outcome of disorder in Iran and the new struggle for Syria. -SW