Here is an interesting debate show in three parts on the election results from Iran’s English-language Press TV featuring Ali Ansari, Kaveh Afrasiabi, and Seyed Mohammad Marandi. Angered by Afrasiabi’s insinuations that he is a British agent, Ansari walks off the set in segment 2. -WW
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The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-e Eslami) along with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC or Pasdaran) are learning to conduct electronic warfare in real-time, but are carrying it out in a particularly Iranian way.
Much like the police response so far in the streets, they have largely avoided draconian responses to demonstrators. They continue to throttle internet connectivity and conduct spotty blockages of sites, but have not shut down Internet access – even in response to external Denial of Service attacks launched from abroad. They have throttled cell phone networks, but this too has been spotty and rather selective. Reports are circulating that they appear to be trying to round up Twitter account holders, but given the continuous stream of posts by known opposition members, they are either very bad at what they do or are holding back. Or this itself is a rumor, purposefully planted (which, if true, is producing exactly the opposite effect intended).
One reason for the authorities to stifle, bully, and threaten but not completely suppress the protesters is to create opportunities for spoofing accounts on various social media sites like Twitter, claiming to be anti-government protesters and spreading all manner of rumors. In one instance quickly identified as being false, a report of large Army contingent – with tanks, no less – was approaching Tehran.
Another reason for the particular approach relates more directly to the nature and current state of Iranian politics, and the need to create a space for negotiation in the coming weeks. It’s in no group’s interest to simply mass-arrest or kill large numbers of demonstrators. Deploying the Basiji thugs is one thing; sending in the Army and IRGC regulars to clean house is quite another. At the same time, the protests have weakened the current leadership in ways it may not yet fully appreciate, which adds considerable risk and uncertainty to the current situation and whatever backroom dealing ensues. Either way, this past week and the next few weeks ahead could set a very different course for the country.
An OpEd appearing in today’s Arabic-press quotes an anonymous Western diplomat as saying he believes Ahmedinejad won the election by the numbers (”Ahmedinejad’s ‘Success’ Delivers Iran into the hands of the Extreme Right”, Huda Al Husseini, Asharq Al Awsat, 6/18). The interesting thing, according to Al Husseini’s source, is that so many people within Iran believe he did not.
Perhaps the Sepah e Pasdaran were spooked by Mousavi’s expressions of pre-polling confidence, and uncertain of the impact of foreign polling and/or social networking technology, and decided not to take any chances. Hence the odd Ahmedinejad majorities in pro-Mousavi locales, the swiftness of the manual vote counting and the comfortable –but not excessive–margin of victory by Ahmedinejad.
Whatever the case, Al Husseini says, it will be increasingly difficult to convince people either in or out of Iran in light of ongoing violent crackdowns, that the regime has the full confidence of its people–in fact, this behavior may have changed quite a few minds. This further feeds into the deep rooted fear of the current leadership that outside powers might make a try at regime change (fears the Obama administration is wisely not stoking). In the past, this was one of the primary motivations for the Islamic Republic to develop nuclear weapons. That motivation has just got much stronger. Al Husseini points to the next few weeks, and ‘behind the scenes dealmaking’ as critical. No doubt, former President Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, reportedly bent on unseating the Supreme Leader, will play a key role in all of this. If protests subside, and no second or partial polling takes place (unlikely, says another source), look for an ‘extreme right-wing’ government, and a very difficult time ahead.
–EDC
According to a report on the reformist “Third Wave” website, At 1600 Tehran time (about 10 minutes from now) Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and former President Muhammed Khatami will participate in a rally in central Tehran. The route is planned from Englelab Square to the Azadi Monument (see route marked in above photo courtesy of Google Earth). The site reports that the has not been given national or city-level permission, but that Mousavi will attend “out of respect for his supporters, encourage calm and to speak with them.” The report also notes that Zahra Rahmavard, Mousavi’s wife will also attend.
Given reports that Mousavi is either under “house arrest” or under surveillance at his home it will be a critical test for the regime whether he is permitted to travel to the site or not. The presence of Khatami is also very significant since he has been keeping a very low profile for the last few days. See below (also courtesy of Google Earth) two zoomed in pictures of the start and end points.
UPDATE: Follow the Iran election Twitter feed on the right sidebar.
Englelab (Revolution) Square
Azadi (Freedom) Monument
In an interview with Asharq AlAwsat Sunday, June 7, Mehdi Karroubi, head of the Etemad-e-Melli party and a Reformist candidate for President, described current relations between Iran and the GCC, Egypt and Yemen as ‘tense’. Karroubi, a.k.a. the “Reform Sheikh”, attributed this to mis-understandings between each side regarding the ultimate goals and political ambitions of the other. He said further that the Gulf region must be a place of lasting peace, free of “constant sectarian recriminations. ” With respect to Yemen, Karroubi said he felt that much of the tension in relations sprang from current problems within Yemen.
In an interview with the same publication the following day, and presumably partly in response to Karroubi’s statements, Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi said Yemen was in favor of better relations with Iran, based on “non-intervention in domestic affairs.” He added that he did not believe that Iran was backing Zaidi (Shiite) Houthi Rebels in Northern Saada provice—at least not as a matter of policy. –EDC
The Saudi-financed Asharq AlAwsat June 2 carried a Q&A with Vice President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid, responding to questions sent by email. The context of the exchange was not stated.
A Saudi citizen asked why the UAE has strong trade relations with Iran, while the Islamic Republic had occupied the Tunb Islands since 1971 and refused mediation– Is the UAE afraid of Iran’s nukes? SMBZ answered, “With respect to the nuclear issue, this is an internal Iranian issue, so long as our brothers in Iran insist it is for peaceful purposes. The Emirates (!-ed) was built on cooperative relations with all states of the world, on the basis of mutual respect and exchange. Most of the Gulf states have such relations with Iran–not just the UAE, and these ties go back hundreds of years.” On the other hand, SMBZ warned, “if the issue of the islands is not put to rest soon, it will create an unpleasant atmosphere with respect to the security and stability of the region.” –EDC
For a bit of overdue color on the contemporary Oman-Iran relationship, see Michael Slackman’s article (Oman Navigates Between Iran and Arab Nations, NYT, May 23, 2009) “The quietly influential Sultanate of Oman has accelerated its cooperation with Tehran, nurturing an alliance that helps empower Iran while highlighting the deep divisions among Arab capitals”.
Slackman’s piece supports points we’ve been making for some time, i.e., 1.) There are clear limits to the pressure the Arab states are willing and/or able to exert on their Northern neighbor (as well as limits to the pressure they’re willing to take from the West) 2.) There are many in the region who feel Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not the paramount to threat to security in the region [see Chorin's article "US Unwise to Deny Iran's Role in the Gulf" in the FT last year] and 3.) It’s largely about trade–the farther east one goes within the Gulf, the more dependent local economies are (and will be) on Iran for future energy needs and economic growth. See previous postings for details on the history of Iran-Oman trade since 2006. –EDC
Pan Arab Asharq Al Awsat on May 14 carried an interesting a piece entitled “Larijani in Mascat: Iran’s power is for the benefit of the all of the countries in the region…and we do not pose either a threat or intend to create an empire.” The comments, made by Iran’s Leader of Parliament, came on an official visit to the Sultanate this past week.
During the visit, Larijani and senior Omani officials praised expanded Omani-Iranian political, cultural and economic cooperation, in particular the Iran-Omani “Kish field” gas deal. The agreement, signed in December of 2008, would in its first phase deliver 1 b. cubic feet of natural gas per day to Oman, through a pipeline linking the underwater field to Oman’s Musandam Peninsula. An extension would carry gas on to the city of Sohar, on Oman’s Batinah coast, West of Muscat. In its final phase, the pipeline is expected to deliver 3 b. cubic feet per day. If Iranian gas were to be re-exported, neighboring countries experiencing severe energy shortages would stand to benefit.
Oman agreed to cover the entire 12 billion US development cost, but has been having some difficulties raising the required capital. An anonymous source told Reuters last week that the global economic crisis would delay completion by a year, to 2013. Larijani’s trip coincided with an official visit to the Sultanate by the head of Hamas’ political directorate Khaled Mishal.The ex-“Enriched Iranium” blog detailed Oman’s growing ties with Iran 2007-2008, including agreements to trade Omani investment in newly-privatized Iranian companies for technical assistance and investment in Omani ports. –EDC
Tehran-headquartered Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL) is looking to expand its reach through slot-sharing agreements with other lines and investments in foreign container terminals. According to Containerisation International (CI On Line, March 22, 2009) the company recently signed agreements with China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) for capacity on the Mediterranean/Asia trade, and Melfi Marinae SA on the Mediterranean-Caribbean Basin trade. Captain A. Ezzati, IRISL’s General Manager for Strategic Planning and International Affairs, noted said the line is “not ruling out” the prospect of investing in terminal facilities in the Med basin, including Tunisia, Algeria and Libya, in anticipation of increased relay cargo from the Far East and Middle East. Malta, Barcelona and Valencia are currently key relay point for cargo going to/from Iran to the Carribean and Central America.
In related news, IRISL is upgrading its fleet to include four six 5000 TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units) and four 5150 TEU container ships, nine 22,000 dwt multipurpose heavy lift vessels and ten open hatch handy-sized bulkers scheduled for delivery. IRISL is one of the largest commercial companies in the Middle East, and ranks 25th globally (as of 2004). The company, which employs some 7,000 staff and carries (2004) 22 million tons per year, controls approximately 40% of the domestic Iranian container trade. The U.S. Treasury Department added IRISL to OFAC’s Specially Designated National (SDN) list in September of 2008, thereby freezing any U.S. assets and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties. IRISL’s domestic representative offices include Bandar Abbas, Bandar Imam Khomeini and Chabahar.
